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Abstract  This  paper  assesses  the  effectiveness  of  the  Everything  But  Arms  (EBA) 
initiative  launched  by  the  EU  in  2001.  It  evaluates  whether  EBA  was  effective  in 
increasing the exports from LDCs to the EU over the period 1995-2006. After arguing 
that the impact of trade preferences should be estimated by using disaggregated trade 
flows  rather  than  aggregated  trade,  the  analysis  is  carried  out  by  considering  five 
products (cloves, coffee, crustaceans, molluscs and vanilla beans) which meet three 
selecting criteria related to the export intensity of EBA countries, to the real/actual 
preferences of EBA and to the intra-year distribution of EU tariffs. Furthermore, the 
exports share of the 5-selected goods with respect to national exports is never marginal 
and, in many cases, is higher than 60%. From an econometric perspective, we improve 
the reliability of results by giving more attention to the econometric setting and to 
measurement of the preferential treatment. The evidence is mixed and while this limits 
the possibility to draw a general conclusion about the role of EBA, it supports the 
decision to work using disaggregated data because the evidence provided allows us to 
gauge  the  sector  specificities  which  would  be  hidden  when  analysing  total  trade. 
Results  show  a  positive  impact  on  the  exports  of  crustaceans  and  vanilla  of  the 
preferential  treatment  granted  by  the  EU  under  EBA,  whereas  the  evidence  is  un-
conclusive when considering the other three products,   
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1. Introduction  
As  trade  is  widely  recognised  to  be  an  engine  of  growth,  developed  countries  have 
implemented a patchwork of trade agreements under which preferential treatment is granted 
to products from developing countries (DC). It is expected that trade preferences determine an 
increase in exports from preference-receiving countries to the market  of preference-donor 
countries  vis-à-vis  other  suppliers.  The  EU,  with  its  high  number  of  trade  preferential 
arrangements signed with DC, is firmly committed to the promotion of open and fair trade 
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with virtually all DC and, through its trade cooperation policy, aims to make a meaningful 
contribution to stimulating export-led strategies in DC. One important scheme which was 
adopted by the EU in order to offer preferential access to DC is the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP). This dates back to the early „70s when the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recommended the creation of a „Generalised System of 
Tariff Preferences‟ to be implemented by each industrialised country. The EU‟s GSP was 
adopted in 1971 for a period of ten years and has been renewed several times, with revisions 
involving the number of GSP arrangements and the products and countries covered, as well as 
the tariff cuts for each product. The current GSP, which was renewed in 2008 for a three-year 
period,  comprises  three  arrangements:  the  ordinary  GSP,  the  GSP  plus  and  a  special 
agreement for Least Developed Countries (LDCs). While only non-sensitive products enter 
the EU duty-free under the ordinary GSP and additional benefits are granted to countries 
implementing  certain  international  standards  of  human  and  labour  rights,  environmental 
protection,  good  governance  and  the  fight  against  drugs  under  GSP  plus,  the  special 
arrangement in favour of LDCs provides tariff free and quota free access to all EU imports 
from 49 LDCs, except arms and ammunition. This is the reason why the agreement is known 
as EBA, Everything But Arms.
1 Besides the comprehensive product-coverage of this new 
initiative, another difference with respect to ordinary GSP and the GSP plus is that it will be 
maintained for an unlimited period of time and will not be subject to the periodic renewal of 
the Community's scheme of generalized preferences (Council Regulation EC No 2501/2001).  
EBA was launched by EU in 2001 and its ultimate goal is to boost LDC growth by removing 
all trade restrictions when they export to the EU market. However, even though EBA provides 
the maximum market access for LDC exports, its effectiveness is not assured for several 
reasons. Some of  these  reasons,  such  as  the weak supply capacity of  LDCs  or the weak 
institutional capacity of LDCs to effectively administer the EU tariff structures, are external to 
EBA while others, like the strict Rules of Origin (RoO) are internal to the new EU initiative. 
Again, granting full market access does not necessarily translate into increased exports from 
all EBA countries because of trade arrangements which pre-existed EBA. For instance, the 36 
EBA  countries  which  are  also  part  of  the  Cotonou  agreement  prefer  to  export  under  the 
Cotonou agreement rather than under EBA. This is for two reasons. The first is that EBA does 
not introduce particular improvements regarding entry into the EU market with respect to the 
                                                           
1 Under EBA, the removal of import duties was delayed until 2006 for bananas and 2009 for rice and 
sugar.   3 
Cotonou agreement because tariffs faced by ACPs were already very low or even zero for a 
large amount of commodities. In other words, many products exported by ACPs did no gain 
any additional tariff preference from the new initiative: they already enjoyed duty-free or 
quota-free entry into the EU. The same reasoning may be made for those EBA countries 
which already enjoyed duty-free access to EU under the ordinary GSP when exporting non-
sensitive products before 2001. The second reason refers to the evidence that the RoO of the 
arrangement signed by ACPs are far less restrictive than those under EBA. This would make 
the use of EBA preferences more difficult and costly than the recourse to other preferential 
treatment  (i.e, Brenton 2003; UNCTAD 2003).  
All  these  considerations,  however,  do  not  necessarily  mean  that  EBA  is  uneffective  in 
encouraging LDC exports to the EU. This remains an open question which will be addressed 
throughout this paper. One method of evaluating whether a preferential treatment encourges 
the exports of preferred countries is the gravity equation. This model, in its basic form, posits 
the idea that trade is positively affected by the economic mass of the trading countries, which 
is  gauged  by  their  GDP  and  population,  and  negatively  influenced  by  the  geographical 
distance between them. The appeal of the gravity equation derives from the opportunity it 
offers for modelling deviations from the normal pattern of trade, where normal is simply 
meant to be the trade determined by the variables usually referred to as gravitational variables 
(GDP, population and distance) in the absence of any other disturbance. Deviations from the 
normal level of trade are captured by augmenting the model with all the factors that may 
hinder or favour bilateral trade flow, such as a common border, language, past colonial ties 
and religion. Preferential trade policies certainly belong to this kind of factor because they 
entail unilateral reductions in trade barriers granted by developed to DC. Hence, other things 
being equal, they are expected to stimulate exports from DC to the preference-giving country, 
so yielding a higher  flow of trade than that which would “normally” be expected. 
The literature which aims at explicitly analysing the impact of EBA by using the gravity 
approach is rather limited in quantity. It is comprised of the papers by Pishbahar and Huchet-
Bourdon  (2008), Persson (2008) and Gradeva and Martinez-Zarzoso (2009). These studies 
share the use of aggregated data, i.e. total exports from LDCs to the EU, and the use of a 
dummy variable as proxy for the preferential policy (this dummy is 1 if the country benefits 
from EBA and 0 otherwise). From an econometric point of view, Pishbahar and Huchet-
Bourdon (2008) use the OLS estimator, while Persson (2008) and Gradeva and Martinez-  4 
Zarzoso (2009) consider the Heckman (1978) procedure in order to control for selection bias 
due to zero trade flows. These three works show that EBA is not effective in increasing LDC 
exports to the EU.  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide further evidence in this field of research by attempting to 
improve the reliability of results obtained when evaluating the effectiveness of EBA within 
the analytical framework of the gravity approach. To this end, the empirical setting looks at 
three key issues regarding the use of disaggregated data of trade flows, the measurement of 
trade preferences and the econometric estimators to be employed. 
 
With regards the data aggregation on which the evaluation of EBA effectiveness ought to be 
based, we argue that, in general, the use of total exports is not adequate for evaluating the 
impact of a trade policy instrument – the preferential trade preference - which is conceived of 
as being applied at product level (see, among many others, Agostino et al. 2009). Indeed, the 
main  objective  of  any  Preferential  Trade  Agreement  (PTA)  such  as  EBA  is  to  alter  the 
incentives for beneficiaries to export more in specific sectors (those in which preferences are 
granted).  This  implies  that  the  correct  empirical  strategy  to  follow  in  evaluating  the 
effectiveness of EBA is to use trade statistics at a very high level of data disaggregation. This 
has two advantages. On one hand, it allows us to understand whether and to what extent the 
preferential treatment granted by the EU to LDCs through EBA enhances the exports of each 
tariff-triggered product. In this respect, if EBA treatment induces an increase in exports in 
each sector, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the scheme will be positive, even if the 
exports of EBA countries do not change at national level. Of course, the impact on national 
exports is the sum of the impacts revealed at product level and the more products eligible for 
EBA preferential are the greater the effect should be on total exports. On the other hand, the 
evidence based on disaggregated data does not suffer from the shortcomings relating to the 
aggregation of tariffs, which, on the contrary, restrict the reliability of results obtained when 
the gravity equation is estimated using trade flows at national level  (Cipollina and Salvatici, 
2008; Anderson and Neary, 2005). As a study cannot analyse all the products, given that the 
amount of data to be elaborated would be enormous (in 2009 EBA covered 7140 HS10-digit 
products),  a  selection  of  products  must  be  made.  In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  a  group  of 
products which have been selected after having satisfied three conditions . The first condition 
refers to the export capability of EBA countries before 2001. The rationale underlying this 
hypothesis is that, when no radical change in the production and export structure of EBAs   5 
occurs in the very short run, a total removal of tariffs determines an effect which can only be 
picked up in the empirical analysis if the preferred countries were able to export before EBA. 
Therefore, we classify all HS4-digit EBA goods by their exports share of the world market in 
2000, that is before EBA was in force. The second condition is that GSP tariffs applied by the 
EU to its imports are positive. This ensures that EBA introduces a real gain, in terms of tariff 
preferences, for all exports from LDCs to the EU market. The idea of the criterion is that it 
would be pointless to evaluate EBA by considering individual products with respect to which 
the EU already guarantees free access under GSP. Finally, we exclude from the study the 
products with intra-year variability of tariffs because, in such a case, one has to use monthly 
data on exports and tariffs. This would require the addressing of the issue of seasonality 
(Cardamone, 2009) which is hard to deal with when the monthly time series reports many 
missing values, as is the case with a number of LDC exports.  
 
The HS-8 level products which satisfied the above mentioned three conditions are cloves, 
vanilla beans, coffee, crustaceans and molluscs. Bearing in mind that we are analysing the 
most vulnerable countries in the world, it is extremely important to point out that many EBAs 
heavily depend on the exports of these five products. For instance, in 2006, exports of coffee 
accounted for 40,85% of Ethiopia‟s total exports, about 35% of Rwanda‟s total exports and 
16% of  Burundi‟s total exports. At the same time, the exports of crustaceans made up 21,2% 
of Madagascar‟s total exports and 3,81% of Mozambique‟s total exports. In 2006, molluscs 
represented  4.3%  of  the  total  exports  of  Senegal,  the  exports  of  cloves  were  4.2%  of  
Bangladesh‟s total exports and the exports of vanilla made up about 5% of Madagascar‟s total 
exports. Even though we are limiting the analysis to a very restricted sample of products, 
these figures  allow us  to  say that the selected  commodities  are really  important  for  each 
individual country. Given that the shares of each product are not marginal, any increase in its 
exports surely has an impacts on the total exports and if the increase can be attributed to 
preferential treatment under EBA, then it will be possible to say that the scheme is pro-
development. 
 
Considering the literature which analyses the role of EBA by using the gravity model, the 
second innovation of this paper regards the variable used to measure the trade preferences 
granted  by  the  EU  under  different  arrangements  (EBA,  GSP,  Cotonou,  regional  trade 
Agreements).  The  proxy  for  preferential  treatment  that  we  consider  is  the  margin  of 
preferences,  rather  than  the  dummy  variables.  Due  to  data  availability,  this  approach  is   6 
becoming more popular in this field of research (see, i.e., Cardamone 2009; Emlinger et al., 
2009). The margin of preference is measured by the difference between the MFN duty and the 
preferential tariff granted under each specific trade arrangement and, therefore, is an explicit 
measure of the preferential treatment which overcomes the two main caveats of dummies. The 
first  caveat  is  that  dummies  cannot  discern  between  different  preferential  trade  policy 
instruments (preferential tariff margins, preferential quotas, reduced entry prices), while the 
second limitation is that dummies do not measure the level of trade preferences (i.e., if we had 
considered dummies, we would have assumed that the level of trade preferences under EBA 
would be the same as those under the Euro-Mediterranean or Cotonou Agreements).  
 
Finally, the third distinguishing feature of the study regards the econometric methods used in 
estimating the gravity model. The methods employed control for heterogeneity, endogeneity 
and selection bias. While a heterogeneity bias might be due to the likely correlation between 
specific  country-pair  fixed  effects  and  regressors,  endogeneity  could  arise  because  of  the 
simultaneity between the dependent variable (EU imports) and the regressors, Hence, before 
using a fixed effect estimator, we first perform the Davidson-Mackinnon test, the results of 
which suggest that the hypothesis of endogeneity of PTA variables may be rejected. As a 
consequence of this, we adopt a negative binomial model which, as the Poisson model also 
does, controls for selection and heteroskedasticity biases  (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), 
but relaxes the heavily restrictive assumption regarding the identical mean and variance of the 
Poisson distribution. 
 
We find mixed evidence with regards the results. When considering the group of EBA which 
are also part of the Cotonou agreement, we find that during the years of the application of the 
new initiative, the exports of vanilla and crustaceans have been positively influenced by the 
trade preferences granted by the EU. The same applies for the exports of crustaceans from the 
EBA countries which did not sign the Cotonou arrangement. Un-conclusive or unsatisfactory 
outcomes were found in the remaining cases.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a descriptive analysis of LDC exports, 
section 3 introduces the gravity model and the estimation methods, while section 4 discusses 
the estimated results. Finally, section 5 concludes.     7 
2. The exports of EBA to EU: a brief descriptive analysis 
 
After  the  introduction  of  EBA,  LDCs  were  expected  to  react  to  the  new  incentives  by 
increasing, ceteris paribus, their market shares in EU markets. This expectation is based on  
the  fact  that,  under  EBA  all  products  from  LCDs,  except  arms  and  ammunitions,  have 
enjoyed duty and quota free access to the EU market (with the exception of bananas, sugar 
and rice for a limited period). With respect to other exporters, EBA countries would  improve 
their competitive position in EU markets because they would get higher prices in a protected 
market  and  this  should  have  a  positive  impact  on  LDCs‟  incentive  to  export  to  the  EU. 
Moreover, EBA is granted for an unlimited period, without periodical renewals, and this is a 
source of certainty which may help strengthen the trade relationships between LDCs and EU.  
 
Table 1 presents EBA market shares regarding three levels of data aggregation (total exports, 
total agricultural trade and 29 HS2-digit products) for the EU as a whole, over the period 
1998-2007. 
 
With regards EBAs‟ total exports, what clearly emerges is that the market shares showed an 
increasing trend from 1998 to 2005, with a substantial shift in 2002, while, more recently 
(2005-2007), they were stable around a value of 0.18%. On one hand, this evidence suggests 
that, as expected,  the market shares of EBA have remained very low, but, on the other hand, 
we find that the relative importance of EBAs as suppliers to the EU-27 market registered a 
substantial increase over the period under scrutiny: the 2007 market share was 0.184%, that is 
to say fivefold that of 1998 (0.038%). The increase in the market share was similar when only 
considering  agricultural  imports.  In  this  respect,  EBAs‟  shares  were  higher  than  those 
regarding total trade, and this fact indicates the more relevant role of EBA within the EU 
agricultural market: these  market shares were 0.089% in 1998, 0.16% in 1999 and increased 
by 0.4%, on average, over the period 2000-2007 (table 1).  
 
A look at the 2-digit agricultural data reveals that the resulting picture is extremely confused, 
in  the  sense  that  only  seven  categories  of  products  (cereals,  cereal-flour-starch-milk 
preparation and products, cocoa, live trees, edible vegetables, tobacco, edible fruit-nuts-peel 
of citrus-melons) registered a clear increase in market shares following 2001. Market shares 
declined for other sectors (animal and vegetables fats, residual-wastes of food industry-animal   8 
fodder,  vegetables-fruit-nut,  meat,  meat-fish-  and  seafood  preparations,  lac-gums-resins-
vegetable saps and extracts), while no clear pattern emerges for the remaining sectors (milling 
products, sugar and sugar preparations, and live animals) (table 1). 
 
Although this examination may help understand the overall changes which have occurred in 
the relative capacity of EBAs to enter the EU market, it does not lead to any conclusion 
regarding the role of EBA. This is also because the HS2-digit level of data aggregation we 
consider in table 1 is still too wide, in the sense that each group is composed of a large 
number of products, which are, in many ways,  very different from each other. The main 
difference we refer to regards the extent of trade barriers that EBA countries have enjoyed in 
exporting to the EU. Since tariffs are established at a very detailed level of data aggregation 
(trade restrictions are established by the EU at HS-10 digit level), the 2-digit trade statistics of 
table 1 may hide product-specific behaviour which we are interested in when evaluating the 
potential  role  of  EBA.  Again,  we  know  that  the  EBA  coverage  in  terms  of  preferential 
treatment is at the maximum level (all goods, except for arms and ammunitions, have un-
limited access to the EU), but there is a great difference within each 2-digit agricultural sector 
when comparing EBA with GSP and ACP tariffs. Indeed, as already mentioned, the effective 
tariff gain associated with EBA only exists if the preferential tariffs applied under other trade 
agreements are positive, and this can occur to a very different extent from one product to 
another product even when they belong to the same sector. 
 
Based on these arguments, we identified a sample of products at the HS-8 level of aggregation 
as  the  group  of  commodities  on  which  the  following  empirical  analyses  is  based.  The 
selection was made by imposing three conditions which refer to the export intensity of EBAs 
at HS4 digit level, the “size” of the preferential treatment given by EBA and the absence of 
intra-year variability of EU import tariffs.  
 
As for export intensity, we order the products at HS4 digit level in terms of EBA share of 
world exports in 2000. This ranking allows us to indentify a list of commodities, with respect 
to which LDCs exhibited a certain degree of market competitiveness before EBA came into 
force  in  2001.  After  ordering  the  4-digit  products  according  to  market  share,  the  second 
criterion  of  selection  is  meant  to  identify  the  products  which  received  a  effective  tariff 
advantage from EBA with respect to the pre-existing trade arrangements. In this sense, we 
restrict the sample to goods with a positive preferential tariff under the ordinary GSP regime,   9 
the most general, world-wide preferential scheme implemented by the EU. Finally, in order to 
avoid all the empirical issues relating to the use of monthly data (for instance those due to the 
large amount of missing values, the size of the dataset and seasonality), we remove all the 
commodities with a tariff calendar. 
 
Considering the 15 groups of products with a world market share above  3% in 2000, the 
selection yields, at HS4-digit level, a sample composed of the following five products: cloves, 
vanilla  beans,  coffee,  crustaceans  and  molluscs.  Table  2  presents  the  three  kinds  of 
information  used  for  selecting  the  five  commodities.  The  data  displayed  shows  that  the 
selected sample of products includes certain goods whose world market is largely dominated 
by exports from EBA countries (EBA market share is 72% in the case of cloves and 65% for 
vanilla beans), while the other three products have a market share of around 4% (coffee and 
molluscs) or 5% (crustaceans) (table 2).
2   
 
For each selected good, figures 1 and 2 show the absolute values and the market shares of 
EBA exports to the EU over the period 1995-2006. The five selected products exhibit very 
different patterns. For instance, total EU imports of cloves and vanilla from LDCs increased 
greatly  immediately  after  2000,  but  they  suffered  a  sharp  reduction  in  2001  and  2003, 
respectively. However, with respect to total EU clove imports, those from LDCs decreased, 
on average, over the period 1995-2006, while LDC export-shares of vanilla beans alternated 
between decreasing and increasing annual changes (an average share of around 0.7%). With 
regards coffee, the time-series of EU imports from LDCs (both in absolute and relative terms) 
was fairly stable, except for an unusual annual change between 1999 and 2000. Finally, EU 
imports  of  molluscs  and  crustaceans  from  LDCs  increased  up  until  2000  and  decreased 
respectively after 2002 and 2003.The same applies for their export-shares (figures 1 and 2).  
 
Another important issue to be addressed concerns the level of tariffs that countries face when 
exporting the 5-sample products to the EU market. Figures 3-7 display the level of import 
tariffs under the four main EU preferential trade agreements, namely the ordinary GSP, the 
                                                           
2 Data from table 2 indicate that some products (ground-nut oil, copra, lac and gums, oil seed and live 
sheep) have been excluded because they have tariff free access to the EU under GSP, while other 
products (nuts, peel of citrus and leguminous vegetables) have been kept out because they are 
subject to tariff seasonality.   10 
preferential  tariffs  granted  to  ACPs,  the  EBA  and  the  average  tariffs  of  Regional  Trade 
Agreements (henceforth RTA) signed by the EU. 
 
The  first  conclusion  is  that  GSP  duties  are  higher  than  those  applied  under  the  other 
preferential schemes (EBA, Cotonou and RTA), whatever the product. While this is the result 
of the tariff-triggered criterion we used in selecting the products, it is also a measure of the 
relative  tariff  advantage  that  LDCs  would  enjoy  if  they  exported  under  the  EBA  regime 
instead of reverting to GSP. Other evidence regards the fact that the duties levied on EU 
imports from ACPs are zero for the five products concerned. This fact gives further interest to 
the analysis because the group of EBAs can be split into two sub-samples. The first sub-
sample comprises the 13 LDCs not belonging to the Cotonou agreement.
3 Before 2001 the 
exports from these 13 LDCs towards the EU market were levied according to the positive 
GSP-tariffs and, thus, the new free market access under EBA increased their competitiveness 
in the EU (we label these countries as 13EBAnot-ACP). The second sub-sample is composed of 
the  36  EBA  countries  which  were  also  part  of  the  Cotonou  Agreement  (henceforth 
36EBAACP).
4  What  emerges  is  that when exporting the 5-selected products  to  the EU, the 
36EBAACP did not obtain any tariff advantage from the new scheme, and this is the opposite of 
what happened to the 13EBAnot-ACP which moved from a regime of positive GSP-tariffs to the 
tariff-free and quota-free access of EBA. The main lesson that can be learnt from figures 3-7 
is that, as far as the five selected sectors are concerned, the 36EBAACP did not enjoy any tariff 
advantage with EBA with respect to their previous status and, in this respect, it is reasonable 
to argue that their capacity to enter EU market did not change because of the new preferential 
agreement. At the same time, it is likely that EBA exerts a certain influence in favour of the 
13EBAnot-ACP because the import tariffs they currently face are zero, i.e. less than the GSP 
duties they would have to pay without the EBA initiative. 
 
                                                           
3 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Djibouti, Kiribati, Lao People‟s Dem. Rep. Maldives, 
Nepal, Solomon Islands, Yemen, Timor Leste, Samoa. 
4 Angola , Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape-Verde,  Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo Dem. Rep, Equatorial-Guinea , Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao‟ Tomé and 
Principe,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,  Solomon  Islands,  Somalia,  Sudan,  Tanzania,  Togo,  Tuvalu,  
Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia. The EEC and  the ACP countries signed their first agreement in 1969 
during the Yaoundé Convention. In 1975, the Yaoundé agreement was replaced by the Lomé 
Convention, followed by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000. The latter agreement was 
replaced by the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2008.   11 
As for the single individual products, we find that in the cases of vanilla, coffee and cloves 
(except for 2000), there was no substantial difference between EBA (or ACP) and RTA tariffs 
(all of them were around zero). Finally, with regards the exports of molluscs and crustaceans, 
EBA attributed an effective tariff advantage with respect to the developing countries which 
had signed an RTA.  
 
3. Empirical setting: the gravity model and the estimation methods 
 
In  order  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the  EBA  initiative,  we  estimate  the  following 
multiplicative gravity equations over the period 1995-2006: 
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where  subscript  i  refers  to  the  individual  EU-15  importers  (i=1,...,15),  j  to  exporters 
(j=1,...191), t to the year (t=1995,...,2006),  and s indicates the agricultural commodities, at 
HS8-digit level, which are included in the five groups of products we select at HS4-digit 
agricultural level,
5 X is the EU‟s import flow, GDP is the Gross Domestic Product, POP is the 
population.  α
s
ij  indicates  the  commodity-country  pair  fixed  effects,  while  u
s
ijt  is  the  error 
term.
6 The acronym MTR stands for Multilateral Trade Resistance and are meant to measure  
trade barriers that each country faces with respect to all its trading partners. As suggested by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), bilateral trade should be higher between trading countries 
with  relatively  low  trade  barriers.  We  determine  a  proxy  of  multilateral  trade  resistance, 
following the  approach  proposed by Carrere et  al.  (2009), which extends the multilateral 
resistance approximation used by Baier and Bergstrand (2009) to a panel framework. MTR 








MTR ln   and 
                                                           
5 There is just one commodity at HS8-digit level within the HS4-digit of cloves and vanilla beans, 
while there are seven at HS8-digit level within the HS4-digit of coffee, thirty-one in the group of 
crustaceans and, finally, thirty-two products in the aggregation of molluscs. 
6 The gravity model specification used does not incorporate the country-pair background based on 
observable  factors  (distance,  common  border,  common  language,  the  number  of  landlocked 
countries in the pair, or past colonial ties) which can be handled using a set of dummy variables. 
This exclusion is due to the fact that the dummies relating to the above mentioned variables are 
time invariant and, thus, will be dropped from the estimation when the country fixed effects are 
supposed to be the pair of trading countries (see below on this point).       12 








MTR ln , where W is the world, i, j, k indicate the individual countries, t 
is time, GDP represents the Gross Domestic Product, DISTik (DISTjk) is the distance in km 
between the capitals of country i (j) and country k.    
 
The GSP variable is the preferential margin granted by the EU to the imports of the s-th 
product from the developing countries eligible for GSP treatment only. In other words, GSP 
regards a sample of countries net of LDCs. Similarly, the ACP variable represents the margin 
of trade preference in favour of the group of countries which signed the Cotonou agreement 
only. The RTA variable indicates the margin of preference granted in favour of developing 
countries which signed bilateral trade agreements with the EU.
7   
 
The procedure used to define the variables GSP, ACP and RTA leaves out the LDCs which 
we split into two sub-samples on the basis of whether they are eligible or not for the Cotonou 
agreement (see § 2). Furthermore, for each of these two groups of countries, we  consider the 
preferential treatment received before and after the implementation of EBA, i.e. before and 







in eq. [1] indicates the margin of 
preference enjoyed up to 2001 by the group of the
 
13LDCs which did not sign the Cotonou 














ACP EBA  are clear. 
 
For each preferential variable (GSP, ACP, EBA and RTA) and each tariff-line, we compute 
the preferential margin as the difference between the MFN duty and the preferential duty 
granted  under  any  specific  trade  arrangement.  Finally,  in  defining  the  margins  of  trade 
preferences, we address the overlapping of preferences by assuming that if a country benefits 
from GSP and ACP agreements, the trade flows enter the EU market under the ACP regime. 
Similarly, if a country benefits from GSP and RTA, then we assume that the imports enter the 
EU market under RTA. These choices are based on two arguments. The first refers to the fact 
that, for the five products considered in this paper, GSP tariffs are generally higher than the 
                                                           
7  The  agreements  included  in  the  analysis  are  those  with  Albania,  Algeria,  Andorra,  Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, 
Israel,  Jordan,  Latvia,  Lebanon,  Libya,  Lithuania,  Macedonia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Norway, 
Palestinian  Authority,  Poland,    Romania,  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  South 
Africa, Switzerland , Syria, Tunisia, Turkey.   13 
preferential tariffs established in favour of ACP and RTA countries. The second consideration 
is that RTA and ACP agreements involve RoO which are much less restrictive than those 
under GSP. Therefore, exporting countries will prefer not to use the GSP scheme even if the 
preferential margin is equal to that received with the Cotonou agreement or with a RTA.  
 
Data on EU imports are from COMEXT.
8 Inward processing imports are subtracted from 
total imports in order to take into account imports entering the EU to be processed and re-
exported merely to benefit from tariff exemption. The set of importing countries is comprised 
of the individual EU-15 member states, while there are 191 exporters, i.e. all the countries for 
which trade statistics are available. As far as the explanatory variables are concerned, data on 
GDP and population are from the World Development Indicators 2008. All data regarding 
values are in constant 2000 Euro. The preferential variables GSP, ACP, RTA and EBA are 
determined using the dataset DBTAR  (Gallezot, 2005) for the period 2001-2004, while for 
the period 1995-2000 and the years 2005 and 2006, they are calculated by extracting the data 
on tariffs from TARIC (http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds/tarhome_en.htm). 
 
With regards to the methods used to estimate equation [1], it is worth noticing that the results 
obtained from the estimation of a gravity equation suffer from three main potential sources of 
bias, which are related to country-pair heterogeneity, endogeneity and the presence of zero 
trade flows.  
 
Heterogeneity may be due to observable and non-observable factors which are specific to 
each country-pair. From an econometric perspective, the omission of such factors leads to a 
mis-specification  of  the  gravity  equation,  and  could  produce  biased  and/or  inconsistent 
estimates. To control for country-pair individual effects, we have included in the gravity 
equation  a  set  of  commodity-country  pair  fixed  effects  (
s
ij  )  derived  from  the  following 






ijt u        (see eq. 1). 
 
                                                           
8 The Comext dataset provides data expressed in CIF value. Thus, in order to transform data to FOB, 
we  compute  the  CIF/FOB  ratio  and  follow  the  IMF  Direction  of  Trade  Statistics  (DOTS) 
procedure. For this calculation, data are from Comtrade and given that this source provides yearly 
data at HS6 level, we assume that CIF/FOB ratios do not differ if we move from HS6 to HS8 
commodity lines.   14 
The  endogeneity  issue  is  related  to  the  fact  that  PTA  variables  could  be  simultaneously 
determined through trade flows. In fact, it is not unanimously agreed whether countries trade 
more because they are in a PTA or that they participate in a PTA because they already traded 
relatively more with each other than with other countries. Thus, we perform the Davidson-
Mackinnon  (DM)  endogeneity  test,  which  compares  OLS  and  IV  estimations  in  a  panel 
framework.
9 As can be seen from table 3, the p-values of the DM test allow us to reject the 
hypothesis of endogeneity of the preferential variables in all estimations. 
 
With regards zero trade flows, we take into account the arguments put forward by Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) according to which a multiplicative gravity specification is more 
appropriate than a log-linear one. These authors show that the log-linearisation of the gravity 
equation changes the “properties of the error term in a nontrivial way” (Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006: 644) because the error terms of the original multiplicative specification are 
heteroskedastic. This bias violates the statistical independence between the error term and the 
independent  variables  and  leads  to  inconsistent  estimates  (see  also  Westerlund  and 
Wilhelmsson 2006). Hence, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) supported the choice of the 
multiplicative specification of the gravity model and employed a Poisson model. We, instead, 
use the negative binomial model with fixed effects because the Poisson model assumes equal 
mean and variance of the dependent variable whereas the negative binomial model allows the 
likely over-dispersion in trade flow observations to be taken into account. 
4. Estimation Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results obtained by estimating eq. (1) through the negative binomial 
estimator. As for the impact of population, it has been argued that larger countries trade more 
and, thus, the coefficients related to population are expected to be positive. However, if an 
exporter  is  large  in  terms  of  population,  it  may  need  its  production  to  satisfy  domestic 
demand, so that it exports less (Oguledo and Macphee, 1994). On the other hand, it may 
                                                           
9 In performing this test we consider just one preferential variable which includes all preferential 
schemes. To define this preferential variable, we address the issue of overlapping as follows: if a 
country benefits from GSP and EBA, the latter is the scheme considered. If a country benefits 
from GSP and ACP or GSP and RTA, then ACP and RTA are the agreements considered in the 
computation, respectively. The logarithm of aid received by the exporting country is the variable 
used to instrument the preferential variable. We have verified that the endogenous variable is 
highly correlated with the instrument, even after sifting out the other exogenous variables in the 
equation, in order to meet the “order conditions” (Wooldridge, 2006).   15 
export more than a small country, as is the case when large firms achieve economies of scale. 
The same reasoning can be applied to the case of the importing country: if large, it may either 
import less because it is likely that the domestic sector finds it profitable to develop and make 
the  country  self-sufficient,  or  it  may  import  more  because  it  cannot  satisfy  all  domestic 
demand with its own production (Pusterla, 2007). We find that the population of exporters has 
a positive impact on imports of vanilla beans, crustaceans and molluscs, while the population 
of EU importers always has a positive and significant effect on imports. The GDP per capita 
of exporters has a positive effect on EU imports of coffee, vanilla beans and crustaceans, 
while the coefficient of importers‟ GDP per capita is positive in the case of cloves and vanilla 
beans.  
 
The estimated impact of PTAs on EU imports varies across products. In particular, it is found 
that the ordinary GSP enhances the exports of vanilla beans, coffee and crustaceans from 
developing countries to the EU. The trade preferences enjoyed by ACPs are only effective in 
increasing EU imports of crustaceans, while RTAs have a positive effect on EU imports in 
every sector (the coefficient is always significant, with the exception of that estimated in the 
model explaining the EU imports of vanilla beans). 
 
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of EBA is provided by looking at the estimated 
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ACP EBA .  By  referring  to  the  general 
arguments regarding the positive role of the preferential treatment in enhancing the exports of 
preferred  countries,  the  sign  of  the  parameters  5  and  7  is  expected  to  be  positive. 
Furthermore, other being equal, we expect that 5>4 because, in the case of 13EBAnot-ACP, the 
new initiative has introduced a substantial increase  on the trade preferences they enjoyed 
under the ordinary GSP up to 2001. As regards the 36EBAACP, we find (see § 2) that when 
exporting the five-sample products included in the analysis to the EU, they received free 
market access under the Cotonou agreement too and, thus, we expect no difference between 
6 and 7.  
 
The study reveals that the impact of EBA is mixed. Let‟s proceed by pointing out that the 
variables   and    are dropped in three out of five regressions. This 
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analysed. Again, no robust result comes from the regression of molluscs. In this case the 
coefficient of  , namely 4, is negative but not significant, while the parameter 5 
remains negative (-0.13) and smaller than 4 after 2001. However, the economic interpretation 
of 5 should be made with caution because of the 10% level of significance. As regards 
crustaceans, we find that the exports from the 13EBAnot-ACP to the EU was positively affected 
by the preferential treatment granted by the EU. This holds both for when these countries 
exported under the ordinary GSP up 2001 (the estimated value of 4 is 0.06) and when they 
enjoyed the free market access granted unilaterally by the EU through the EBA initiative (the 
estimated value of 5 is 0.04). Thus, in the regression of crustaceans, as 5 is positive but 
lower  than4,  we  conclude  that  EBA  positively  affects  the  exports  from  13EBAnot-ACP  
although  this impact is lower than that determined by the ordinary GSP before 2001. 
 
As far as the group of 36EBAACP is concerned, results displayed in table 3 indicate that the 
estimates obtained when explaining the exports of coffee and molluscs are not interpretable 
because of their low statistical significance, while a negative effect of EBA after 2001 has 
been found in the case of cloves. Encouraging evidence comes from the regressions of vanilla 
and crustaceans. It has been found that the trade preferences granted by the EU have been 
effective in increasing these exports, both before and since 2001. When analysing the exports 
of vanilla, it emerges that the estimated impact of ACP preferences is β6=0.25 for before 
2001, i.e. when these 36EBAACP countries used the preferences under Cotonou,. The effect of 
trade  preferences  increases  to  β7=0.41  when  considering  the  years  (2001-2006)  of  EBA 
application. All this suggests that the preferential treatment granted by the EU in favour of the 
36EBAACP determines a substantial positive impact in increasing the exports of vanilla beans 
towards  the  EU  market  and  that  this  impact  increases  when  moving  from  the  years  of 
application of Cotonou to the years of application of EBA. A similar positive impact of trade 
preferences is obtained when considering the exports of crustaceans from 36EBAACP to the 
EU. In such a case, the group of 36EBAACP benefits from the trade preferences received both 
during the years of application of Cotonou (β6=0.05)  and when EBA is into force (β7=0.40). 
 
The evidence shows how results differ from one sector to another. This, on the one hand, 
limits the possibility to draw a general conclusion about the role of EBA, but, on the other 
hand, supports the approach followed in this paper of conducting a study using data at product 





ACP not EBA  17 
hidden  when  using  aggregated  trade  flows.  With  regards  the  estimations,  as  said  above, 
regressions  yield  poor  results,  except  for  vanilla  and  crustaceans.  This  is  an  unexpected 
outcome for two reasons, at least. The first is that exports from EBA countries absorbed in 
2001 accounted for a substantial world market share and secondly that the tariff gains due to 
EBA were not marginal for the group 13EBAnot-AC  (see table 2 and figures 3-7). In a nutshell, 
EBA did not divert LDC trade from the rest of the world towards the EU, though 13EBAnot-AC  
got a substantial tariff gains in the concerned sectors. 
 
From an econometric perspective, the unexpected evidence obtained for the clove, coffee and 
mollusc  sectors  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  array  of  exports  comprises  scant  observations 
regarding EBA exports. In other words, the array of the margin of preferences under EBA is 
composed of a very limited number of positive values or, equivalently, by a massive number 
of zeros. This makes the estimation procedures very difficult. In brief, EBA exports to the EU 
were driven by just a few countries which exported to a restricted number of individual EU 
importers for a limited number of years. By limiting the discussion to the 5-product case 
studied in this paper, it emerges that there was no radical change in the structure of trade 
relationships with the EU over the years of application of EBA.
10 We observe that no EBA 
country became a new  exporter to the EU, a fact that could be interpreted as a result, in these 
sectors, of the new initiative. In addition, EBA countries‟ world market share in the five 
analysed  sectors  tended  to  diminish,  something  which  may  have  been  due  to  the  role  of 
emerging actors in the world market or/and to the likely tendency within each EBA country to 
divert production and exports towards other more remunerative sectors. The understanding of 
these facts lies beyond the scope of this work, but it is likely that they are an explanation of 




                                                           
10 For instance, no country in the 13EBAnot-ACP group exported cloves, coffee and vanilla beans to the 
EU over the period under scrutiny, only one exported molluscs and, finally, only five exported 
crustaceans. The same applies when considering the 36EBAACP. In this case there were just two 
exporters of cloves and vanilla beans and seven coffee exporting countries. Furthermore, these 
products were imported by a very restricted number of individual EU15 countries and the relative 
trade flows existed, at maximum, for four out of twelve years. As for molluscs, there were just 
seven 36EBAnot-ACP which exported to the EU, while crustaceans were exported to the EU by 
twenty five 36EBAnot-ACP. Finally, Tanzania only exported vanilla beans to Belgium and, then, just 
for one year, 2000.   18 
5. Conclusions 
This paper assesses the effectiveness of the EBA initiative on the LDC exports of cloves, 
vanilla beans, coffee, crustaceans and molluscs over the period 1995-2006. The sample of 
commodities is derived from a selection process based on three conditions concerning the 
overall export capacity of EBA countries, the existence of an effective tariff gain for LDCs as 
a result of EBA and the absence of intra-year seasonality in tariff levels. 
 
With respect to the literature dealing with the same issue, the role of EBA, and using the same 
empirical framework, namely the gravity model, we introduce a few innovations. First of all, 
in this paper preferential trade policies are measured not by a dummy, but by a preferential 
margin. Secondly, the paper presents an evaluation obtained by using data disaggregated at 
HS8 level in order to avoid aggregation bias in calculating an average measure of tariffs and 
with the aim of better identifying the key trade flow on which the preferential treatment is 
expected to have an impact. Thirdly, we control for country heterogeneity, endogeneity and 
selection bias due to zero trade flows. Estimations were made using the negative binomial 
model. 
 
Results,  in  some  ways,  contrast  with  those  obtained  in  previous  works  which  have 
unanimously  found  that  EBA  was  not  effective  in  increasing  EU  imports  from  LDCs.  It 
should be noted that those papers consider total trade and not imports at commodity level. On 
the contrary, by using trade at a very high level of data disaggregation, we have shown that 
the  EBA  initiative  exerts  a  positive  role  in  enhancing  LDC  exports  to  the  EU  for  some 
products. In particular, the exports of crustaceans and vanilla were positively affected by the 
preferential treatment under EBA during the years of the application of the new initiative, 
while no conclusion can be draw when considering the exports of coffee, molluscs and cloves. 
 
Many factors  contribute to the result regarding the partial effectiveness of the EBA initiative. 
For instance, we get an indication of the weak trade relationship between EBA countries, as a 
group, and the EU by looking at the trade statistics used throughout this work. We find that 
there are very few LDCs actually exporting to the EU and this, from a technical point of view, 
is a source of the unsatisfactory estimations. This is because, whereas on one hand, EBA may 
have had a positive effect on an individual country, on the other hand, this effect might not be 
captured by a gravity equation, because the estimated parameters refer to the average impact   19 
of the EU policy. This is, of course, common to all regressions whatever the subject, but in 
our  case  it  is  exacerbated  by  the  massive  presence  of  zeros  in  the  array  of  margins  of 
preference under EBA. 
 
From a more general point of view, the fact that only a few LDCs exported to the EU could be 
due to the weak supply capacity of LDCs, but it is also related to the existence of non-tariff 
barriers, such as transaction costs associated with the RoO, administrative compliance and 
sanitary  and  phytosanitary  standards  which  might  lessen  the  effectiveness  of  preferential 
margins, especially for the smallest or poorest countries. In particular, as Bureau et al. (2007: 
196) highlighted, the main motivation for the low utilisation of preferences is that DC are 
unable to “match the technical, sanitary, phytosanitary and traceability requirements imposed 
by developed countries, and, in particular, the private standards imposed by importers and 
retailers”. Indeed, producers in developed countries can take advantage of technology whereas 
producers in developing or less developed countries are often unable to satisfy the standards 



















Table 1 Export market shares of EBA countries in the EU-27 market (1998-2007).                    
Groups of Products (2-digit) 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
HS01 Live Animals  0.008  0.006  0.004  0.123  0.010  0.019  0.035  0.283  0.001  0.021 
HS02 Meat and Edible Meat Offal  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.025  0.049  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000 
HS03 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, acquatic invertebrates  0.134  0.401  2.118  2.368  2.697  3.290  3.000  2.443  2.381  2.603 
HS04 Dairy Products, Eggs, Honey Edible Animal  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.001 
HS05 Products of Animal Origin  0.002  0.025  0.392  0.031  0.005  0.025  0.028  0.021  0.030  0.027 
HS06 Live Trees,  plants, bulbs, roots, cut flowers, etc.  0.002  0.010  0.006  0.009  0.006  0.030  0.033  0.233  0.441  0.849 
HS07 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers  0.054  0.035  0.051  0.150  0.183  0.173  0.293  0.346  0.313  0.327 
HS08 Edible fruit, nuts peel of citrus, melons  0.070  0.097  0.113  0.086  0.103  0.085  0.118  0.127  0.128  0.111 
HS09 Coffee, tea, mate and spices  0.466  0.922  1.090  2.359  3.251  3.537  3.010  3.195  3.259  2.565 
HS10 Cereals  0.011  0.006  0.005  0.014  0.012  0.013  0.026  0.036  0.032  0.025 
HS11 Milling products, malt, starches, nulin wheat gluten  0.001  0.008  0.009  0.021  0.015  0.033  0.062  0.015  0.052  0.045 
HS12 Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruit, etc,  0.301  0.172  0.163  0.151  0.152  0.166  0.282  0.264  0.177  0.129 
HS13 Lac, gums, resins, vegetable saps and extracts  0.347  0.467  0.410  0.962  0.775  0.667  0.467  0.430  0.530  0.583 
HS14 Vegetables plaiting materials, vegetable products  0.726  0.512  0.345  1.913  2.554  3.309  3.236  2.799  2.331  2.093 
HS15 Animal, Vegetables fats and oils, cleavage products, etc  0.502  0.260  0.951  0.965  0.565  0.337  0.228  0.167  0.064  0.193 
HS16 Meat, fish and seafood food preparations  0.250  0.118  0.772  0.790  0.522  0.863  0.661  0.515  0.519  0.451 
HS17 Sugars and sugar preparations  0.019  0.357  0.456  0.710  0.490  0.897  0.797  0.572  0.816  1.027 
HS18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations  0.025  0.015  0.056  0.082  0.094  0.068  0.108  0.145  0.134  0.118 
HS19 Cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations and products  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.009  0.005  0.009  0.019  0.029  0.041 
HS20 Vegetable, fruit, nut etc food preparations  0.008  0.001  0.015  0.012  0.043  0.014  0.011  0.011  0.008  0.039 
HS21 Miscellaneous edible prepariations  0.002  0.001  0.004  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.003  0.002  0.004  0.002 
HS22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar  0.000  0.002  0.013  0.007  0.010  0.008  0.007  0.011  0.007  0.007 
HS23 Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder  0.051  0.015  0.093  0.111  0.123  0.064  0.033  0.008  0.022  0.024 
HS24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes  0.014  1.132  1.032  0.914  0.906  0.922  0.777  0.913  1.646  1.817 
HS29 Organic chemicals  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000 
HS35 Albuminoids, modified starches, glues, enzymes  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.001 
HS41 Raw hides an skins and leather  0.038  0.055  0.061  0.755  1.233  0.874  1.089  1.138  1.286  1.331 
HS50 Silk  0.001  1.564  3.425  0.005  0.013  0.005  0.005  0.002  0.010  0.010 
HS53 Wool, animal hair, horsehair yarn and fabric thereof  0.098  0.224  0.098  0.228  4.067  2.572  2.834  3.216  3.270  4.149 
Total Agricultural Exports (from HS01 to HS24)  0.089  0.160  0.353  0.421  0.421  0.469  0.418  0.408  0.442  0.444 
Total Exports  0.038  0.050  0.083  0.105  0.196  0.196  0.225  0.199  0.170  0.184 
Source: own computations on data from Comtrade (as it is on July 22, 2009).                  21 
Table 2 – Selecting criteria of the products at HS-4 digit level. 
Commodity 
EBA world 
exports %  GSP tariff  Stagionality? 
Cloves (whole fruit, cloves and 
stems)  71.032%  positive  No 
Vanilla beans  65.226%  positive  No 
Ground-nut oil, fractions, not 
chemically modified  32.158%  equal to MFN (=0)  No 
Copra  12.322%  equal to MFN (=0)  No 
Live sheep and goats  8.772%  since 2002 GSP tariff 
was equal to 0  No 
Coconuts, Brazil nuts and cashew 
nuts, fresh or dried  8.642%  equal to MFN (=0)  Yes 
Lac, natural gums, resins, gum-
resins and balsams  6.780%  equal to MFN (=0)  No 
Peel of citrus fruit or melons  5.963%  positive  Yes 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits nes  5.486%  equal to MFN (=0)  No 
Crustaceans  5.024%  positive  No 
Leguminous vegetables, fresh or 
chilled  4.709%  positive  Yes 
Coffee, coffee husks and skins and 
coffee substitutes  4.335%  positive   No 
Molluscs  4.049%  positive  No 
Tea  3.947%  zero  No 
Vegetable material for plaiting  3.530%  equal to MFN (=0)  No 
Animals, live, except farm animals  3.285%  positive  No 
Source: own computations on data from Comtrade and Taric. 
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Table 3 - Estimates of the multiplicative specification of the gravity model. Dependent Variable: imports in levels, 1995-2006. 
   Cloves 0907   Vanilla beans 0905 
Coffee, coffee husks 
and skins and coffee 
substitutes 0901 
Crustaceans 0306  Molluscs 0307 
                                               
GSPonly  -0.2796  (.08)  ***  0.1160  (.05)  **  0.0468  (.02)  **  0.0450  (.)  ***  -0.0262  (.01)  *** 
ACPonly  -8.2794  (422.79)     -0.0279  (.06)     0.0484  (.03)     0.0451  (.)  ***  -0.0573  (.02)  *** 




















ACP EBA   -0.1963  (.08)  **  0.4101  (.07)  ***  -0.0572  (.06)     0.0396  (.)  ***  0.0000  (.01)    
log(POP_exporter)  -0.142  (.06)  **  0.180  (.05)  ***  -0.120  (.03)  ***  0.027  (.01)  ***  0.037  (.01)  *** 
log(POP_importer)  0.507  (.09)  ***  0.511  (.08)  ***  0.205  (.04)  ***  0.192  (.01)  ***  0.156  (.02)  *** 
log(GDP/POP_exporter)  -0.808  (.14)  ***  0.262  (.08)  ***  0.454  (.03)  ***  0.072  (.01)  ***  -0.041  (.01)  *** 
log(GDP/POP_importer)  1.374  (.31)  ***  1.453  (.3)  ***  -0.151  (.12)     -0.100  (.03)  ***  -0.004  (.05)    
MTR_importer  -1.218  (.38)  ***  -2.686  (.45)  ***  -0.254  (.15)     0.195  (.04)  ***  0.141  (.07)  ** 
MTR_exporter  83.330  (15.62)  ***  6.084  (7.33)     7.920  (1.43)  ***  8.561  (.38)  ***  8.854  (.55)  *** 
Trend  0.191  (.02)  ***  0.180  (.02)  ***  0.159  (.01)  ***  0.008  (.)  ***  0.161  (.)  *** 
Costant  -30.158  (4.25)  ***  -33.673  (3.87)  ***  -325.611  (16.87)  ***  -8.268  (.37)  ***  -9.082  (.57)  *** 
                                              
Observations  1056       1350       4877       60432       26322      
Wald Chi-square  297.5       266.44       757.54       1752.44       2718.18      
Log-Likelihood  -3549.0056       -4433.5239       -15643.176       -195601.09       -88998.935      
Davidson-MacKinnon 
test of exogeneity  0.5026       0.2125       1.4988  0.5026    0.1621      2.8904     
p-value 
0.4791       0.6454       0.2214  0.4791    0.6872      0.0892 
   
Note: all regressions include yearly dummies; standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity). (*), (**), (***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 23 
 
Figure 1 – EU imports from EBA countries of five selected HS4-digit agricultural products 

















































































































































































































































































































Figure 2 – Export market shares of EBA countries in the EU market of five selected HS4-digit 




















































































































































































































Figure 3 – Tariff trend for EU imports of Cloves by PTA, 1995-2006. 
 
Figure 4 – Tariff trend for EU imports of Vanilla beans by PTA, 1995-2006. 
 
































Figure 6 – Tariff trend for EU imports of Crustaceans by PTA, 1995-2006. 
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